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Abstract: This study will present the results of several simulation-based analyses investigating the performance of distribution
network protection under a range of future scenarios. It is widely accepted that the integration of a significant amount of
distributed generation, often from renewable energy sources and interfaced to the main network via power electronics
converters, will be commonplace in the future. Furthermore, at the transmission level, the interconnection of different countries
through HVDC links and the decommissioning of many large-scale conventional synchronous generators will result in the power
systems becoming progressively weaker in terms of reduced faults level and lower system inertia. This study will, therefore,
illustrate and emphasise the challenges and issues that arise in future distribution networks protection due to reduced system
strength, fault level and the changing nature of the contribution (both in terms of magnitude and possibly delay in provision) to
fault levels and the possible impact this may have on traditional overcurrent-based protection schemes by building a simple
model of distribution network in Simulink, MATLAB. In addition to that, the paper will also discuss some potential solutions as
novel schemes to tackle the arising protection related problems.
1 Introduction
In response to climate change, highly reliable and secure power
supply with economical solutions, the conventional power system
network is changing and moving towards a future power system
network where increase amount of recent technologies is expected.
These technologies include penetration of distributed generators
(DGs), the interconnection of HVDC links within different
countries and energy storage where all of them will be connected to
the networks through power electronics converters. Although the
technologies are supposed to be a blessing for the consumers, it is
creating some challenges in future power system networks which
are needed to be dealt. Thus, this paper focuses on the protection
related issues that are created in distribution networks and tried to
quantify as well as illustrate through the aid of simulated scenarios
of built Simulink model of the distribution network.
Provision of voltage support, reduction in power loss, improved
power quality, improved reliability, the release of additional
transmission and distribution capacity and so on can be considered
as the positive impact of the addition of recent technologies in the
power system [1]. However, the negative impacts of the
technologies are predominated as they are replacing the
conventional synchronous generation. The affected areas and the
challenges in the future power system networks are summarised in
[2–4] and mostly affected areas are System inertia, Rate of Change
of Frequency (RoCoF), Frequency Containment, System Stability,
Control System, Voltage management and Protection.
The protection of the power system has been vastly affected due
to changes in short-circuit level (SCL) and leads to the incapability
of the existing protection techniques – differential protection,
distance protection and overcurrent protection to operate
accurately. In addition to that, the authors of [5–10] concluded
several different protection related problems which may cause
severe damage to the system. Sympathetic tripping, coordination
between relays, sensitivities of the relays, unintentional islanding,
over and under voltage issue and failure of auto-reclosers are some
of them.
To solve the vulnerable situation due to the inadequateness of
the conventional protection system, several types of research have
been carried out to suggest an alternative approach or novel
protection scheme. As part of it, the authors of [11–13] have
discussed directional overcurrent scheme where the fault is
detected through both voltage and current sensors. On the other
hand, Horak and Babic [14] suggest positive, negative and zero
sequenced fault detection techniques by numerical directional
overcurrent scheme. However, the scheme seems very expensive
anyway due to its additional requirements for fault detection. Thus,
in [15] it is suggested that current-only directional overcurrent
scheme (CDO) which only requires current sensors to detect the
forward and backward directions of the fault current.
Adaptive protection scheme can also be a solution for the
mitigation of future power system protection. The scheme is based
on the philosophy of controlling the different functionality of the
protection system based on the situation that arises in the system so
that future issues in the power system can be overcome [15].
However, different approaches to adaptive characteristic
implementation and algorithms are discussed in [16–19]. The main
drawback with the scheme is, it is economically expensive as
communication links between the relays along with synchronised
phasor measurement of current with DG location and CBs are
required.
Another scheme that can overcome the future challenges is
called Agent-based protection scheme. The scheme is based on the
distribution equipment and communication network, which
incorporates both directional overcurrent and adaptive protection
scheme. The main advantage of the scheme is; it can work during
unavailability communication networks. In that case, the decision
will be taken based on the last available information and fault
current magnitude which seems very suitable for distribution
network protection [20, 21].
Furthermore, in [22, 23] a new protection scheme called radial
basis neural network based scheme is discussed. Although the
scheme seems inexpensive and suitable for the distribution
network, it has a very complex algorithm and owing to the fact that
much research has not been done on the scheme, there is a question
about the practical feasibility of the scheme.
2 Test distribution network with overcurrent
protection
To illustrate and verify the future distribution networks protection
related issues, a simple model of distribution network has been
built in Simulink, Matlab and the one-line diagram along with a
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Simulink model of the test distribution network are shown in
Figs. 1 and 2, respectively. 
The built distribution network in Simulink (Fig. 2) is a three-
bus network where Bus A is connected to the 11 kV three-phase
synchronous generator representing infeed from the transmission
level and Bus B and Bus C are connected to the DGs and load. The
network is built, using the UK's distribution networks parameters
(fault level of grid infeed, the internal impedance of the generators
and distribution line impedance) based on the model specification
described in [23, 24].
In order to justify and verify the protection problem, a scheme
is required for the system so that the change of characteristics can
be observed. Thus, the most generic form of protection scheme for
the distribution network, overcurrent protection scheme has been
chosen and an overcurrent relay has been built in the Simulink, as
shown in Fig. 3. 
Three inverse definite minimum time (IDMT) overcurrent
relays are used on three different buses and each relay requires
time multiple settings (TMS), plug settings (PS) and output from
current transformer (CT) as input and provides tripping signal (will
it trip or not) and operating time (if operating) as output. Each relay
has different settings based on the fault level or fault current
calculated for each bus. The settings for each bus are shown in
Table 1. 
The naming of the relays is based on the name of the buses, that
is Relay A is installed at Bus A and same goes for Relays B and C.
In addition to that, each of the relays is designed in a way so that
upper relay can operate for the downstream relay's backup. The
characteristics curve for each relay with settings described in
Table 1 is shown in Fig. 4. 
3 Simulation scenarios
Various future scenarios have been tested in the built Simulink
model of the distribution network such as variation in grid infeed,
fault resistance and fault capacity of the DGs. The results for each
of the scenarios have been shown with the aid of overcurrent relay
characteristic and the location of the faults are also being varied for
each case.
The simulation of the network can be divided into two
categories. First, variation in system parameters, which is variation
in grid infeed and fault resistance. Second, variation in DG location
and DG capacity.
4 Variation in fault level of grid infeed
Transmission grid infeed is a crucial part of the system as fault
current level largely depended on it. The fault level from grid
infeed for UK's distribution network is 250 MVA [23]. To observe
the overcurrent relays characteristic and fault current level at
different buses, the fault level from grid infeed has been changed
from 25 to 250 MVA in the step of 25 MVA.
4.1 Fault current level at different buses
Due to the variation of fault levels of grid infeed, the fault current
at different buses changes and the observations are shown in
Table 2. 
As the fault level of grid infeed is decreasing from 250 MVA,
the fault currents in the other buses are also decreasing. It is known
that the protection scheme largely depends upon the fault current
level of different buses. Thus, it has a direct impact on the
protection settings and may not respond to the faulty condition
while required due to the low fault current contribution from grid
infeed.
4.2 Relay operating characteristic
Change in grid infeed will have a significant impact on the
overcurrent relay's operating time. So, to observe the impact of grid
infeed variation on relay's tripping time, fault has been injected at
distinct locations of the system and named as ‘Fault C’ (located
after Bus C), ‘Fault B’ (located between Buses B and C) and ‘Fault
A’ (located between Buses A and B). Each relay's operating
characteristic due to variation in grid infeed for different locations
of the fault is shown in Fig. 5. 
As mentioned earlier, the upstream relay will provide back-up
by operating comparatively slowly for the downstream fault and
thus, relays A and B (in Fig. 5) both are operating for the faults at
B and C. However, as the relay C is the most downstream relay, it
will operate only for fault C.
It can be seen that (from Fig. 5), as the fault level is decreasing,
the operating time for all relays are increasing. According to the
protection settings, the safe operating time is 0.5 s (500 ms). If a
relay takes more time than that, it causes serious hazards to the
system due to the flow of high current for a longer period and from
Fig. 5, the observation is relay B will take >0.5 s when grid infeed
is <70 MVA and for relay A, it is around 100 MVA. Moreover, in
the case of backup protection, the operation is further slow.
5 Change in fault resistance
Fault resistance is another important parameter of the power
system network. The fault resistances for each fault, ‘Fault A’,
‘Fault B’ and ‘Fault C’ are varied between 0.001 (∼0) and 5 Ω.
However, fault level of grid infeed is kept constant at 250 MVA to
observe the impact on relay operation under the change of fault
resistance. So, if fault resistance varies due to the addition of DG,
then the operating time of the relay's will change and operation of
the relays are shown in Fig. 6. 
The operational time of the relays is increasing as the fault
resistance increases and in case of relay B, the operating time is
crossing the limit of 500 ms for fault B, when fault resistance is 3 
Ω. Similarly, for relay A, when fault resistance is 1 Ω, the
operating time is >500 ms for fault A.
6 Variation in DG location and short-circuit
capacity
To observe the adverse effect on protection system due to the
addition of DGs in the system, the locations and short-circuit
capacity of the DGs are varied and the observation is presented in
terms of fault current variation and operating time of the relays of
different locations.
6.1 Fault current level at different buses with DG
The location of the DGs will be varied between buses B and C. It is
obvious that the fault current level will increase in the buses if grid
infeed has not been changed. However, DGs are now supplying
power to the load and as a result, grid infeed will decrease. Thus,
effects will be observed by adding DG in bus B first, then turns
come for DG at C. DG at B is named as ‘DG1’ and DG at C is
named as ‘DG2’. The short-circuit capacity for each DG is
assumed 50 MVA and the comparison of the fault current change
between without DG and DG1 & DG2 is shown in Table 3. 
From Table 3, the observation is the addition of DGs has an
impact on the downstream buses fault level but not on the upstream
buses. Thus, bus A fault current level remains unchanged for both
DG1 and DG2 and bus B fault level will remain unchanged for
DG2. However, while grid infeed is high the change on fault
current is low, in the case of DG1 38.5% and for DG2, change is
50%. However, during low grid infeed, change is very high, for
both DG1 and DG2, change is around 70%.
Fig. 1  One-line diagram of test distribution network
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6.2 Relay operating characteristics
As the addition of DGs in downstream buses does not have an
impact on upstream buses, the operating time of relay A will
remain same for fault A. However, change can be observed due to
fault level variation of buses B and C. The operating time of all
relays will change according to the variation of the fault level of
Fig. 2  Simulink model of the test distribution network
 
Fig. 3  Overcurrent relay used in the system for bus A
 
Table 1 Relay settings
CT ratio PS TMS
relay A 400:1 1.75 (175%) 0.17 s
relay B 200:1 1.25 (125%) 0.15 s
relay C 200:1 1 (100%) 0.06 s
 
Fig. 4  Relay characteristics
 









25 1.287 1.061 0.9217
50 2.573 1.805 1.436
75 3.86 2.356 1.764
100 5.147 2.781 1.992
125 6.433 3.118 2.159
150 7.72 3.392 2.287
175 9.007 3.619 2.388
200 10.290 3.810 2.470
225 11.580 3.973 2.537
250 12.870 4.115 2.594
 
Fig. 5  All relay's operating time vs. grid infeed for a fault at distinct
locations
 
Fig. 6  All relay's operating time due to change in fault resistance
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buses B and C. The relay C characteristics with DGs at various
locations are shown in Fig. 7 and relay C characteristics due to
variation in short-circuit capacity of DG2 are shown in Fig. 8. 
Figs. 7 and 8 prove that the addition of DGs and variation of
DG SC capacity decreases the operating time of the relays. In
Fig. 7, it can be observed that, as bus C is the most downstream
bus, the addition of DG at any location will decrease its operating
time and the same goes for variation in the SC capacity of the DGs
which can be seen in Fig. 8 for relay C. Similar effect can be
observed for other relays too for both cases.
6.3 Sympathetic tripping with instantaneous protection
Generally, overcurrent protection has characteristic of time grading
which takes a longer time to operate in case of an upstream relays
fault condition. As a result, the high fault current flow could
damage the system during that extra time. Hence, an instantaneous
characteristic is provided with the relay so that it can operate very
fast during the high fault current flow. However, due to additional
fault currents supplied by the DGs, false tripping with
instantaneous overcurrent protection can take place. A simple case
of that false operation is shown in Fig. 9. 
Fig. 9 shows the relay B characteristics with the instantaneous
element. The figure also contains two points on it for comparing
operational time for relay B with and without DG while fault is at
C. However, the DG in B supplies extra fault current to fault C
causing an increase in total fault currents, forcing the relay B to
lose it backup coordination with relay C and operates
instantaneously. In this way, relay B operates faster compare to
relay C, which is sympathetic tripping for relay B even though the
fault is at C.
6.4 Nuisance tripping for under-voltage protection
If the fault in the system is not cleared within 0.5 s, then the under-
voltage protection of the DG will be activated because of the 80%
(or more than that) reduction in nominal value of the voltage. If the
fault is in the bus A, the voltage of all downstream buses will be
reduced and due to the addition of DGs, fault contribution from the
grid infeed will be low. Thus, the operating time will be higher as
shown in Fig. 5. Fig. 10 shows the three-phase voltage for bus B
when the fault is at A. 
While DG1 is connected to the network and grid infeed is
around 120 MVA. The relay is taking >0.5 s to operate. In the
meantime, voltage is reduced to around 3500 V (peak) from 8800 
V (peak). Fault started at 0.1 s and finished at after 0.65 s due to
the operation of relay A. In this time, under-voltage protection for
DG1 will activate and isolate the system, which is a nuisance
tripping for the system as it is operating due to the slow operation
of the other overcurrent relay.
7 Probable solutions of the issues
The coordination problem of the relays can be mitigated by
changing the settings of the relays, depending upon the DG
locations, the short-circuit level of the DG and change in grid
infeed. The adaptive protection scheme and the agent-based
protection scheme, in this case, seem prospective solutions to the
problems. In both schemes, the settings of the relay can be changed
depending on the situation. At the same time, both schemes can be
the solution for the under-voltage nuisance tripping because the
problem is highly influenced by the grid infeed level. When the
infeed level is low, the fault level of bus A will also be very low.
The low fault level means fault currents will be decreased which
leads the slow operation of the relay A. Thus, to remove such
Table 3 Comparison of the fault levels at different buses between without and with DGs
Grid infeed, MVA Without DG With DG1 With DG2
Fault current at bus
B, kA
Fault current at bus
C, kA
Fault current at bus
B, kA
Fault current at bus
C, kA
Fault current at bus
C, kA
25 1.061 0.9217 3.634 2.395 3.495
50 1.805 1.436 4.379 2.697 4.009
75 2.356 1.764 4.93 2.896 4.337
100 2.781 1.992 5.354 3.037 4.565
125 3.118 2.159 5.691 3.143 4.732
150 3.392 2.287 5.965 3.225 4.86
175 3.619 2.388 6.192 3.29 4.961
200 3.810 2.470 6.383 3.343 5.043
225 3.973 2.537 6.547 3.387 5.111
250 4.115 2.594 6.688 3.425 5.167
 
Fig. 7  Relay C operating time due to variation in DGs location
 
Fig. 8  Relay C operating time due to variation in SC capacity of DG2
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situation from the network, it is necessary to change the settings of
the relay according to the grid infeed and DG's short-circuit
capacity.
Again, sympathetic tripping is the biggest issue of all other
challenges. A potential solution to the problem is to use directional
overcurrent relays in place of the conventional overcurrent relays.
Directional overcurrent can detect the fault in reverse direction.
Thus, it will be able to detect the fault contribution from DG2
which is causing unnecessary tripping for relay B before the
operation of relay C for a fault at C. In addition to that, another
solution can be agent-based protection scheme, which suggests
connecting relays in both ends of the bus. This also can provide
correct operation of relay A by accurately measuring fault
contribution from DG2. One more advantage of the scheme is, it
can communicate with other relays. Thus, it is possible to make the
relay A operate faster than the relay B in case of contribution from
DG2 is very high.
8 Conclusion and future work
The renewable energy based power stations are small-scale
generators based system and generally connected to the distribution
network of the power system network through power electronics
converters. These increased number of distribution generators
causing some negative issues and challenges for the power system
network. The paper identified the issues and challenges that are
arising in the future distribution network, focusing on the
protection related issues. Also, discussed some solutions in the
form of novel protection schemes that can replace or modify the
existing protection schemes so that the challenges in the future
power system networks can be solved.
The simulation and analysis for this paper had been limited
owing to the allocated space for this paper. So, there is a vast
opportunity to do further works on the simulations and develop
some other solutions too, based on works related to the issues
mentioned in this paper. Unwanted Islanding scenario, single-phase
fault demonstration and implementation of other protection scheme
are some of the simulation scenarios which can be tested.
Furthermore, practical implementation of the simulated scenarios
in Real Time Digital Simulator and comparison between real and
simulated results can also be done.
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Fig. 10  Three-phase voltage at bus B due to a fault at A
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